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I present an attempt to construct multi-period, finite horizon extensions
to the well -known two- period financial innovations literature.  I first extend
the definition of competitive equilibrium with innovations.  It is shown that, with
a dominating household type, it is impossible to observe a set of complete Arrow
securities with a positive amount issued for each of them in equilibrium, either at
the last date or at any date.
RESUMEN
En este trabajo se presenta una primer extensión del modelo standard de
equilibrio general con innovación financiera endógena a economías de más de
dos períodos (con horizonte finito). En primer lugar se extiende la definición de
equilibrio competitivo con innovaciones financieras, incluyendo la posibilidad
de introducción de nuevos productos financieros en períodos posteriores al
inicial. Se demuestra que, si existe un tipo dominante de inversor (con la mayor
tasa marginal de sustitución de todos los consumidores), es imposible observar
en equilibrio un conjunto completo de activos de Arrow ofrecidos por los
innovadores, tanto en el último período como en cualquier otro intermedio.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The question of how financial structure arises endogenously is still a
puzzling feature in economic theory.  The traditional incomplete markets literature
assumes an exogenous financial structure1.  Nevertheless, the empirical evidence
about the continuous financial innovation in the past two decades implies that the
traditional approach cannot tell much about why it was observed an impressing
amount of new financial products in the last twenty years.  This evidence is
summarized by Duffie and Rahi (1995).  Hence, a new theory that makes the asset
structure in some way endogenous is needed to explore the reasons for this
evidence.
Duffie and Jackson (1989) constitutes the first paper known in this area.  It
presents a problem of innovation in futures.  They assume that the objective of the
exchange is to maximize volume, so that the amount of commissions paid to each of
the exchange members is maximized.  They evaluate different possible Nash
equilibria for the innovation problem.  The main result is that the optimal
monopolistic contract in a two period economy is Pareto optimal.  They also construct
an example of a Nash equilibrium in which the contract design does not lead to a
Pareto efficient allocation.  They present another example for a multi-period economy
in which the monopolistic case can be Pareto suboptimal as well.  In any of these
cases, though, the main assumption is volume maximization as the innovator’s
objective, with the implicit assumption of having commissions that are positively
related with the amount of trade.  But this last feature was not explicitly modeled.
Parallel to this last framework, the early works by Allen and Gale (1988,
1991, 1994) focus on models in which the innovators explicitly maximize some
profit function and also consumers maximize their utilities subject to standard
budget constraints in equilibrium.  They add short sales restrictions as incentives
to issue new assets.  They model production economies in which the firms issue
securities to finance production plans.  In Allen and Gale (1988), where no short
sales are allowed, they prove the existence and constrained efficiency of the
competitive equilibrium with innovation, in an economy with only one type of firm.
In that case, under suitable conditions, they show that any set of innovated assets
is equivalent to a pair of  “extreme securities”.  In Allen and Gale (1991), they extend
their result to an environment with more than one type of firm, departing from the
perfect competitive analysis to get into more strategical considerations.  This
actually allowed for short sales in equilibrium.
Several new approaches were then developed in pure-exchange and
production economies.  Some of the papers explore the need for collateral in the
process of innovation.  Important contributions were Pesendorfer (1995) and Chen
(1995).  Pesendorfer provides a definition of a competitive innovation equilibrium
and proves its existence.  Under this equilibrium definition, households and
1 For a review of the standard GEI literature, see Magill and Quinzii (1996) for an
introductory level, and Magill and Shaffer (1991), for a more advanced treatment.
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innovators optimize their respective objective functions while markets for goods,
standard securities and innovated securities clear.  He also shows the constrained
efficiency of the equilibrium, as well as the possibilities of having redundant newly
issued assets that do not span the state space.  One of the most important
characteristics of his model is the non-linearity of equilibrium asset prices (for the
newly introduced financial products).  This is a consequence of (fixed) marketing
costs of those new assets.
On the other hand, Chen (1995) characterizes the pricing of innovated
securities, showing that they are sub-linear in the payoff structure.  He also shows
through examples why there may be such incentives to introduce new securities
and which role the “trading frictions’’ play in financial innovation (generalizing the
no-short sales case done by Allen and Gale, 1988).  He detects cases in which there
can be profitable innovation, introducing a very small amount of a new financial
product into the market.
More recently, an asymmetric –information – based security design literature
has been developed.  The paper by Rahi (1996) studies the problem of an informed
risk-averse entrepreneur that decides the type of asset to issue.  The main result is
that the insider does not float a security that gives the entrepreneur any informational
advantage.  In other words, the asset is such that a fully revealing rational
expectations equilibrium arises.  This result is mainly driven by the presence of
adverse selection in the secondary market.  Another important contribution along
this line is the work by DeMarzo and Duffie (1999).  In this paper the issuer is also
an insider.  However this agent needs to back the security with specified assets.
On the other hand, inside information may cause illiquidity in the sense of a
downward sloping demand curve for the innovation.  Thus the design of the
security implies a trade-off between cost of retention of cash non included in the
asset and the liquidity cost of including those cash flows.
On the other hand, there exists a branch of the more traditional GEI literature
where the focus is the effect of an exogenous introduction of a new security on
equilibrium prices and allocations.  This has mainly been motivated by the example
in Hart (1975) who shows a case in which introducing an asset in an incomplete
markets economy actually implies a Pareto worsening move.  This literature then is
mainly interested in showing how special was that Hart’s example.  Some
representative work on this has been done by Elul (1995, 1999), Cass and Citanna
(1998) and Calvet et al. (2000).  However, as stated above, all these papers take the
financial structure as exogenous and only considers exogenous introductions of
assets.
All the approaches mentioned in the previous paragraphs were studied in
two-period economies.  The obvious problem in such frameworks is that there is
no way of differentiating “short - term’’ from “long-term’’ securities.  Real-world
capital markets, on the other hand are characterized by the presence of very different
maturity assets.  Moreover, Duffie and Rahi (1995) present some evidence of
financial innovation in real world markers.  Those new assets have had very different
maturities.  It is clear that a model with a two period economy is insufficient to
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study the economic rationale for these different lengths and maturity dates of
financial innovations.
In this paper, I attempt to present a first extension of the two-period analysis
to multi-period economies.  In a finite horizon economy which last at least for three
periods, there is a potential for a richer variety of innovations.  My first goal is to
introduce an equilibrium definition, named multi-period financial innovation
equilibrium.  Here consumers choose optimally their portfolio of a riskless bond
and new financial products at each node of the economy, subject to short sale
constraints (as in Allen and Gale, 1988).  In this equilibrium the so-called financial
innovators (whose profits are derived from issuing new financial products) also
maximize their discounted expected benefits.  The innovators may intervene in the
riskless bond market, purchasing part of the bonds that consumers have (as part
of their endowment) and “spliting them up’’ into new securities, similar to
Pesendorfer (1995).  The innovators have limited liability.  Then at every period
and every history profits must be non-negative.  Innovators can purchase the
riskless bond and pay dividends on old issues by either issuing more new assets
or getting the payoffs from the last-period riskless bond holdings.  The innovator
cannot borrow.
This extension is not trivial at all, and so only some very preliminary results
are obtained within this framework.  I first check that with risk-neutral consumers,
there is no room for innovation.  The intuition is obviously that the main objective
of issuing new securities in this economy is to improve risk-sharing of consumers.
Then, we could expect that risk neutral consumers have just no need of risk sharing
at all.  Hence an introduction of a new asset (unless it gives a higher expected
return) does not improve welfare for any investor.
The remaining results show sufficient conditions on consumption
allocations such that they cannot be supported by a complete set of Arrow
securities.  It is well known that this type of asset structure is the simplest example
of contingent contracts specified in many different applications in macroeconomics
and finance.  In particular, if one type of consumer has the highest intertemporal
marginal rate of substitution for each state, then the equilibrium with endogenous
financial structure cannot be supported by a complete set of Arrow securities.  If
those marginal rates of substitutions are high enough, then there can be no Arrow
security issued in such an equilibrium.  These results constitute at least a guide
that provides a better understanding of how the equilibrium consumption allocation
cannot look like if Arrow securities are available, a fact that was ignored in the
traditional literature with exogenous set of Arrow securities.  However, this
proposition is also certainly special.  It still leaves open the question of what the
conditions must be in order to obtain allocations that can be supported by some
arbitrary asset structure that at the same time is optimal for the innovator.
It is important to note that there has been some recent contributions that
refer to financial innovation in multi period economies.  The work by Bettzuge and
Hens (2001) consists in a model which is a sequence of static CAPM economies (a
sequence of successive generations who live only two periods).  The main focus
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of the authors is the survival of newly introduced assets in the long run.  They
analyze this by assuming some transition function mapping participation rates
from period t to participation rates in t+1.  This provides an equilibrium evolutionary
process governing the amount of trading in each new asset.  The model however
does not model explicitly how the assets are introduced.  A paper by Willen (1999)
provides a CARA-Normal framework with finite horizon to evaluate the welfare
effects of financial innovation.  Apart from the CARA-Normal assumption, this
paper still assumes an exogenous introduction of new assets.
In section 2 the economy is introduced, while in section 3 the equilibrium
concept is defined.  In section 4 the results for risk neutral consumers are presented.
In section 5 the characterizations of consumption allocations that cannot be
supported by Arrow securities are provided.  Finally, in section 6, conclusions and
possible directions for future research are proposed.
2. THE ECONOMY
Assume a pure - exchange economy that lasts for T+1 discrete time periods,
where . t 2 ¥ < £  At every period  , 1 t‡  there exists a random variable whose
realization is denoted by st, that take values on a finite set S.  There is a unique
non-storable consumption good at each period, whose spot price is normalized to
one.  In the first place I introduce the features about the financial structure and in
particular the characteristics of innovators.
2.1. Standard securities
Following Pesendorfer (1995), I assume that there is a riskless bond.  Note
that I simplified the original structure, since he assumed a more general set of
standard securities.  In the present structure, the bond lasts for the  T period.  At
each particular node st the standard security pays off exactly one unit of the
consumption good.  I denote q(st) as the price of the standard asset at period t and
history st.
2.2. Financial Innovators
Assume a continuum of identical financial innovators, so that we do not
have to consider an inter-dealer financial market (the one in which only innovators
will trade).  The representative innovator can issue at every node st a number
K (st) of assets.  In equilibrium K(st)  must be such that no innovator at any of the
nodes has an incentive to introduce an additional security.  Each product issued at
st is denoted as k(st).  With an abuse of notation, I also denote K (st) as the set of
innovations produced at node st.   Each product  k (st) gives payoffs in consumption
goods at every possible subsequent node, denoted as  ) s , s ( d j t
) s ( k
t , where
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j £ t+1.  I assume that  ) s , s ( d j t
) s ( k t ‡ 0 for all t and j.  Note that from here we can
define an asset by its length from the dividend structure.  I say that an asset issued
at node st lasts for t periods, where t + t £ T, if for any r ‡ t + t + 1, we have that
. 0 ) s , s ( d
t r t
) t s ( k =
-
 This means that the only possible periods in which this asset
gives positive payoffs are t+1, t+2, ...  , t.  In the definition of equilibrium I will be
using, this is enough to characterize the length of an asset.  Since there is a
problem of indeterminate scaling, I assume, for every st, sj, for every t and j:
(1) B ) s , s , s ( d j t
S s ) s ( k t £ ￿
˛
where B is some large positive integer.  Note that this includes the case of no
innovation:
(2) ( ) S , 0 s , s , s d s
j t
) t s ( k ˛ " =
An asset structure (or innovation structure) is defined as a collection of
dividend matrix payoffs in the following way.  I denote D0 as the collection of matrix

































t D denotes the dividend payoffs in period t+1, if the particular history
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) s , s (
D has rows that lie on a compact subset of




) s , s (
D is compact on  xS ) K(s
t
+ ￿ , and so 
t s D is a compact subset
of  . ) S ... S S 1 ( xSx ) K(s
1 T 2 t - + + + +
+ ￿
Let us denote  ) s ( k t q as the total number of shares of security k(st) issued at
st.  I assume that this amount is a non-negative real number.  I also assume that
issuing 







Ø  Here C is a
continuous function mapping  . to ) S ... S S ( x ) K(s






represents the “issuing technology’’ possessed by the innovator.  It states how
much resources should be devoted to place a new financial product in the market.
These resources include items such as research expenditures, marketing
expenditures and similar types.  This is a special case of the cost function in
Pesendorfer (1995), since he assumed that the total issuing costs were decomposed
in two parts, one independent of the amount of payoffs (associated with marketing
costs) and the other component exactly as in our case.  Here I am not dealing with
fixed marketing costs, although its inclusion is a feature that could be explored in
the future.
I define the price of an asset issued at period t in the market at period t+j as




) s ( k .  This defines the number of goods that an agent must give up at
node st+j to buy one unit of the k(st) asset.  The way this is given is described
below, but it is essentially the marginal willingness to pay of the “most interested’’
consumer type.  This means that the price for a potential new financial products is
given by the household who values it more, that is, the one with the highest
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution adjusted by the payoffs d.  This follows
the classical “rational conjecture’’ adopted by most of the literature.
On the other hand, I assume that the innovator backs the new issues using
the standard riskless security.  Denote  ) s ( t y as the portfolio of the riskless bond
traded by the innovator at node s t .  This is the only extra-source of income perceived
by the innovator in order to finance the new financial products.
2.3. Households
I assume a continuum of households.  There are I types, each measure 1.  I
also assume that I < ¥.  At every node st, the agent receives an endowment in
consumption good equal to wi (st) >0.  Let us assume for simplicity that for every
t, every st, and for all i, we have  , M ) s ( sup
t i
i £ w for some large but finite positive
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M.  I also assume that each household has a standard Von-Neumann-Morgestern,
time-state separable utility function:










i s s c u U
T t
m ￿ ￿ b =
˛ =
where mt  (st) denotes the probability of occurrence of history s t , and ci (st) denotes
the consumption of type i household at node st.  I will suppose for simplicity that
mt (st) is common across types for any event st, that is, rational expectations hold
all the time.  The per-period utility given by ui (ci(st)), strictly is C 2, strictly
increasing, strictly concave and satisfies the usual Inada conditions for every i.
Hence I assure interior solutions for at least one agent.
At every node st, the type i consumer can trade in the spot market for the
consumption good, and also in all open asset markets.  In this last case the i-th
household can trade the riskless standard security and also the set of existing
innovations up to and including the node s t.   I denote zi (st)  as the portfolio of the
standard security and denote  ) s ( y j t i
) s ( k t
+ as the portfolio of the innovation k(st)
issued at st held by i at node st+j.  An important assumption done here is that:
(7) Z ) s ( z
t i - ‡
(8) ( ) 0 s y
j t i
) t s ( k ‡
+
with Z > 0 and for all i, st, k (st) , and s t+j.  This is essentially the same framework as
in Chen (1995) .  Notice that this includes the absence of short sales, as in Allen
and Gale (1988).  The presence of short sales constraints in competitive markets
would be especially important for existence of equilibrium.  Since the objective of
the paper does not include showing the existence of an equilibrium I defer this task
to future research.
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and for T:




0 j ) s ( K






- ￿ + + w £
where the inner product for the innovations denotes the sum over all innovations
of the values of the portfolios and payoffs.
2.4. Prices for innovations
The innovators must “guess’’ the price for their products whenever they




) s ( k must be inferred by the
innovators, since they are not marketed assets at the time of the issue.  There is no
past information based on the market for a new issue.  As in the literature, I use the
assumption of rational conjecture for the price  ) s ( r t
) s ( k
t , which is usual in the
literature.  The innovators guess exactly what the price is in equilibrium.  In our
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This holds for all st , and all t.  The dependence of r with respect to Dst comes
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+ 2 .  This rational conjecture
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) s , s (
r ) s , s ( d
)) s ( c ( u
)) s , s ( c ( u
max ) D , s ( r t t
t
1 T t
2 One could argue that the innovators could also change the price by changing the
quantity of the new asset. Nevertheless, this contradicts assumption of perfect
competition, which assumes that no individual agent can change the price with its own
quantity decision. The reason of why the individual dividends do affect the price is
that, changing the payoffs, an individual innovator could attract a large number of
investors (as long as the change in payoffs imply a rise in utilities for investors),
increasing then the profits for the new assets producers.
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3. EQUILIBRIUM
The equilibrium concept presented here is just an extension of the Allen
and Gale (1988) and Pesendorfer (1995) definitions, in which all the consumers
optimize, the "representative" innovator optimize and markets clear.








￿ m p ￿d







) s ( ) s ( max
subject to:
(15) 0 ) s ( t ‡ p
for any t, any st, where:
(16) [ ] ) s ( q 1 )( s ( · ) D ( C ) D , s ( r ) s ( t 1 t
) K(s
st st t
) s ( K
t
t t + y + q - = p -
) s ( ) s ( q ) s , s ( d ·
t t j t j
) K(s
1 t
0 j ) s ( K
j j y - ￿ q -
- -
=
for all  1 T t 0 , s
t - £ £ and:









- ￿ q - y = p
for all sT.  Here p(st) denotes the period t, node st payoff of the innovator.  She
chooses a collection of matrices D satisfying the restrictions above:
(18) B ) s , s , s ( d j t
S s ) s ( K t £ ￿
˛
for some large B >I, and for any st, sj, t and j.  Also, let us restrict the choice of q
and y on compact sets Q and Y such that in fact, in equilibrium, the compactness
will not be an issue.
The restriction (15)  for the one-period innovator 's profits is called delivery
constraint.  This implies that the innovator must pay the purchases of riskless
bond portfolios and the dividends to the owners of the innovators delivering the
corresponding amount of the consumption good.  This at the same time comes
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from the payoffs of the riskless bonds purchased one period before and the revenue
for the new innovations at any node st.  In a sense, this constitutes a short sale
constraint to the innovators.
The households will be maximizing their utility functions (6) subject to the
budget constraints (9), (10) and (11).  This is the household problem.
The market clearing conditions are given by:
(19)
t t t I
1 i
i s 0, ) s ( ) s ( z " = y + ￿
=
(20) t j , s , s , ) s ( y j t




) s ( K
t t ‡ " " q = ￿
=
in the asset markets and




i ￿ w = ￿
= =
in the goods market.
This allows to define a competitive equilibrium with financial innovation.
Definition 1
A competitive equilibrium with financial innovation is a set of consumption
allocations  t i,







) s ( y ), s ( z j i
) s ( K
t i
t ,
a collection of portfolios of standard securities held by the innovators  )}, (s { t y an
amount of innovated assets, 
t t
s ) s ( K ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿q , a collection of payoff matrices D, and a
price system q(st),  , t j ), s ( r j
) s ( K
t ‡ such that
(1) The allocation, t i,







) s ( y ), s ( z j i
) s ( K
t i
t  solves the household's
problem as stated before, taken as given the price system and the dividend payoff
matrices for each asset.
(2) The collection )}, (s { t y
t t
s ) s ( K ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿q and D maximizes the repre-
sentative innovator objective function, also taking as given the price system.
(3) Market clearing conditions hold.
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Remark 1
Though this concept of equilibrium is close in spirit to the one given in
Pesendorfer (1995), I do include no marketing plan.  The reason is that, due to the
assumption that each type of consumer has Lebesgue measure one, then each
type will be choosing a portfolio yi of innovated securities, and so the marketing
plan is trivial: in Pesendorfer’s case, the marketing plan was induced by the Lebesgue
measure on the space of consumers.  But in our case that is just one for each i.
Then we do not need to introduce any other element in the definition.  Second, we
use the pricing rule by Allen and Gale (1988).  This is because we are assuming the
absence of fixed cost of marketing as it was assumed in Pesendorfer.  This means
that there are no complementarities between assets.  This makes simple the pricing
for innovated securities, and it can be shown that sub-linearity (see Chen, 1995) is
also true even for the multiperiod case.
4. THE CASE OF RISK NEUTRAL HOUSEHOLDS
When the households have linear utility functions, then the pricing of
innovations becomes straightforward.  Indeed, for an innovation issued at node s t
the following is true.











) s ( K
j st t




(23) { } i I i
max b ” b
˛
and  ) s (
1 t
t
+ m denotes the conditional probability for the event s t+l conditioned on
information available up to time t.
From this it is clear that the price inferred by the innovator is linear in
payoffs.  Then the total per-period return for the innovator is as follows.























)) s ( q 1 ( ) s ( t 1 t + y + -
) s ( ) s ( q ) s , s ( d •
t t j t j
) K(s
1 t
0 j ) s ( K
j j y - ￿ q -
- -
=
This holds for 0 £ t £  T- 1, where p (sT)  is defined as before.
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In this case, the following first - order conditions characterize the optimum
amount of supply for innovations:
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for all k (st).  This can be reduced to:
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) s ( K  is the k(st) component of the vector  ) D ( C
t s .  From here it is
easy to show the following proposition.  (Proofs of this and all propositions are in
the appendix)
Proposition 2




) s ( K  > 0, for all st, all k(st), and also  d £ b .  Then no
innovation is possible under these assumptions.
The proof is a direct application of the first order conditions stated before.
The intuition is also very simple.  Since agents are risk neutral, they do not have
risk sharing purposes.  The only possible motive of asset accumulation is future
consumption.  Hence, if the innovator is patient enough so that she has a higher
discount factor (or equivalently, a lower discount rate) then she is not interested in
selling any new asset in the market.  Households are more impatient and they have
less desire to save.  The more impatient the risk neutral consumers are, the less
savings they want to do, and the less room is to have financial innovations.
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This is also true even when the less impatient type of consumer has the
same degree of impatience than the innovator (that is, d = b  ).  This is because
there is a cost associated with the issuing of new assets.  At first sight there would
be a possibility of having a market opened for a new set of securities.  The marginal
value of those assets between the supply and the demand side are equal.  The
presence of issuing costs inhibits the former of introducing those assets.
On the other hand, we can show that we can obtain an equilibrium from
“accommodating’’ the cost function and the factor d.
Proposition 3




) s ( K  > 0.  Then there is no financial
innovation equilibrium in this economy for any finite T, with positive amount of
new financial securities.
The proof of this is available upon request.  It has a straightforward, almost
obvious intuitive appealing.  Since risk neutral consumers have no interest in
sharing risk, there is no incentive to buy financial assets except to translate
consumption through time.  Hence the only relevant parameter is the (subjective)
discount rate.  In a sense, the innovator cannot be differentiated from the rest of
the consumers, so that the former becomes "one more type" of household.
Therefore the only agent interested in transferring consumption through time is
that one with higher degree of patience.
5. AN IMPOSSIBILITY RESULT WITH RISK AVERSE H OUSEHOLDS AND  I.I.D.
SHOCKS
The literature on financial innovation and incomplete markets has often
studied how the financial innovators could improve the risk sharing of consumers.
This issue is however completely hidden with risk neutral consumers, as mentioned
earlier.  Hence it is obvious to generalize the analysis of the last section to the risk
- aversion case.  Nevertheless, a general framework is somehow cumbersome and
requires a very detailed analysis.  This section then provides some characterization-
of-equilibrium results.
Let the economy has the property of having equally likely states at each
period.  That is:
(27) ) s (
) s (




1 t p =
m
m +
for all t, for all st, for all s in S with 0 < p (s) <1.  Here mt (st, s)  denotes the
probability, conditional to the realization of st and the information available at that
node, of occurrence of the event s at t+1.
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I start considering different asset structures as candidates for equilibrium
innovations.  I consider the possibility of having an equilibrium with the following
asset structure.  The innovator issues at each node st a complete set of Arrow
securities that pay 1 unit of the consumption good if the realization at next period
is s and 0 otherwise.  That is, the payoff for the innovation k (st) = [st, s]  is defined
as:








We will show that there is no possible financial innovation equilibrium with
a strictly positive amount of all of the Arrow securities issues for some special
condition at the one-before-last node sT-1:
Proposition 4
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That is, for s T-1, there is one type of consumers with the maximum
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution for any of the possible states in the
last period.  If  0 ) D ( C
1 T s >>
-
, for all s, then the allocation ci (st) cannot be
supported by a strictly positive amount of Arrow Securities for the last period of
the economy.
The intuition of this result is as follows.  The presence of a consumer
whose equilibrium intertemporal MRS is the greatest for all states in period T
implies that a unique consumer would be the buyer of all Arrow securities.  But this
would imply this agent only needs to smooth consumption between  T-1  and T.
However, a cheaper way of attaining this is by buying the riskless bond.
This last result can be slightly generalized in the following way.
Proposition 5
Assume S ‡ 2.  Suppose also that for all st, where % t £ T-1, there is an
allocation and some i* (st )  such that the following condition is satisfied:
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for every t.  Then, the consumption allocation cannot be supported by a complete
set of Arrow securities supplied in positive amounts by the innovators for all st.
The interpretation or these propositions is clear.  If a complete set of Arrow
securities were available and if consumer i* has the highest intertemporal marginal
rate of substitution, this consumer must be the one that purchases all the securities.
But since this is true for every state, then consumer  i* is finally purchasing a bond,
which is costly.  However there exists a riskless bond which is already available at
no extra cost3.
These two results lead to the following natural corollary:
Corollary 6
 If all the households are identical, if conditions (B)  and (C)  of proposition
5 are satisfied, and if costs of issuing assets are positive, then there is no financial
innovation competitive equilibrium with a positive amount of complete set of 1-
period Arrow securities traded at any of the nodes st.
Proof
This follows from propositions 4 and 5, since the condition for the latter is
clearly satisfied in a representative household economy.
3 I thank one of the referees for providing this nice interpretation.
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In fact, this result can be easily generalized to state that under the same
conditions we have that in fact any consumption allocation characterized by
inequality (29)  implies that it cannot be an equilibrium allocation with an incomplete
set of Arrow securities issued by the innovators.
Proposition 7
Assume condition (29)  is true.  Then it is impossible that such consumption
allocation may be implemented through an incomplete set of Arrow securities
endogenously issued by the financial innovators at T-1.  If condition (A)  from
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for all s, then it is impossible that this allocation can be supported by an incomplete
set of Arrow securities issued at any t by the financial intermediaries.
The proof is presented in the Appendix.  This proposition then states that
the conditions before also block the possibility of having any set of Arrow securities
as an equilibrium financial structure.  Note that condition D states that the maximum
MRS for every state is at least equal to the innovator’s discount factor.  This result
may seem surprising since intuitions says that a sufficiently high intertemporal
MRS would be enough to provide an incentive to introduce securities in order to
improve risk sharing.  However, again, given that the highest MRS belongs to the
same person (for every future state), if the financial innovator purchases riskless
bonds to back Arrow securities, the bond price would be d.  But then it would be
cheaper for the consumer with highest MRS to purchase the bond rather than
Arrow securities.
The results presented above may suggest that conditions A through C may
be enough to eliminate an equilibrium with any type of financial innovation, not
only Arrow securities.  However, condition A only states that for every node st
there is some household with the highest MRS between t and t+1 for all s in S.  But
the name of the household i* (st)  may change through different nodes of the tree.
Hence generalizing the Arrow securities impossibility results to the general case
may require stronger conditions such as the fact that the household with the
highest intertemporal MRS is always the same across all nodes.  However this is
not an obvious question, leaving this investigation for future research.
This set of results can be summarized in the following way.  They provide
a set of sufficient conditions that show when it is not possible to observe innovation
equilibria with either any set (complete or incomplete) of Arrow securities (in addition
to the riskless asset) at any node.  The main intuition is that for Arrow securities to
be issued in equilibrium the risk sharing needs by consumers must be non trivial.
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Clearly, pure intertemporal consumption smoothing by itself cannot imply a positive
amount of Arrow securities issued.  These results are important in the sense of
giving conditions under which we should not expect (a complete set of) short term
securities to appear in the market.
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
In this paper I propose an equilibrium concept for a multi - period economy
with endogenous financial innovation, called financial innovation equilibrium.  The
special feature in this equilibrium is that financial innovators choose which markets
for new financial products to open (including date and state), the amount supplied
for each of them, and their payoffs (and in this way, indirectly, the duration of the
innovations).  The prices for these new products are assumed to be rationally
conjectured directly from the preferences of the households in this economy.  This
is also consistent with the standard GEI models with financial innovation.  I checked
formally the statement that, with risk-neutral households, no financial innovation
occurs.  This is due to absence of incentives for risk sharing.  I also provide some
preliminary characterization with risk averse agents.  In particular, sufficient
conditions are provided so that we cannot support allocations with a complete set
of short lived Arrow securities, either in the last period of the economy, or in any
period.
This is only a preface of a long term research program.  The next natural
step is to show different cases which could show the different possible asset
structures that can arise in equilibrium within this framework.  Especially important
is to provide sufficient conditions to get different equilibria with very different
asset durations, as observed in the data.  The conjecture is that these conditions
will be strongly cost-of-the-innovators dependent.  I leave this for future research.
Another task is the extension of these economies to infinite periods.  It is
known that with finite periods, rational expectations and no informational
asymmetries, the pricing of any asset in a competitive framework is totally determined
by the fundamentals, even with incomplete markets.  This can clearly disappear in
the presence of infinite horizon.  Thus, we could have that the pricing of new
financial securities are not determined uniquely by the payoffs they will offer in
the future periods, but instead some “bubble” effect can arise, and then the
“rational conjecture” is not as simple as in the finite horizon case.  The presence of
bubbles under incomplete markets has been explored by Santos and Woodford
(1997) among others.  This work suggests that some innovators could be tempted
to place new financial products whose payoffs are relatively much smaller than the
price the households are willing to pay, due to a bubble.  This issue requires also
future work and its exploration is also part of the research program.
This paper assumes that the driving force for new assets is the need for
improving risk sharing.  This is not clearly the unique motivation for more securities
to show up in the market.  Clearly there are other phenomena that justify the
subsequent introduction of new assets.  For example, tax arbitrage may also be
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another reason for new assets.  However a model that only focuses on tax arbitrage
without other motivations (e.g., without risk sharing motives), provided that the
tax system is assumed exogenous, does not seem too interesting.  More important
is the study of the interaction between taxes, risk sharing and financial innovation.
This is also very relevant for the analysis of optimal taxation, which is also left for
future research.
There are other potential sources for financial innovation that seem
more involved.  First, market illiquidity may call for financial innovation,
specially in the form of securitization.  However, market liquidity is usually an
endogenous variable strongly affected by informational issues, as stressed, for
instance, by Grossman and Miller (1988) (see also chapter 8 in O’Hara, 1995).
Modelling this in a true dynamic model is beyond the scope of this paper, but it
must also be emphasized that this task is not trivial at all.  Asymmetric information
affecting liquidity may be resolved through time independently of financial
innovation, and this process is itself quite complicated.  Similar points can be made
if one consider the case of agency costs.  Financial innovation may help in reducing
these costs through time, but they could also be reduced through reputation and
other effects alike.  Modelling this requires to work with multiperiod versions of
agency costs models of corporate finance, which is clearly beyond the scope of
the current paper.
7. PROOFS
Proof of proposition 2
First of all, for all the households types such that  , i b < b they will
be just consuming their endowments, since they value any of the assets strictly
less than how the "less impatient type’’ value them.  So for those i, we should have
ci (st) = wi (st).  Then, by non-arbitrage, the price of the riskless security is equal to:





1 t) s ( q
for any t.  This is because otherwise, the demand for riskless bond done by the
type with highest b  is unbounded.  We also have that:
(31) 0 ) s (
t = y
for every st, since d <  b .  In particular, this implies that
(32) 0 ) s ( 1 T = y -
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But then, since at time T we cannot have any innovation (for any possible
innovation done at date T, we have that 
0 ) s ( K T r
= , then the condition:
(33) ) s , s ( d • ) s (
j T j 1 T





- ￿ q ‡ y




‡ 0 for every  ) s , s ( j T j - , every j, implies that for every




= 0.  This in particular gives that for any innovation introduced at
time T-1 we have:
(34) ) s , s ( d ) s ( r 1 T
S s ) s ( k
1 T
) s ( k 1 T 1 T
-
˛
- ￿ b = - -
Since  0 ) D ( C
1 T s >
-
, the first order condition implies that there is no
positive (profitable) innovation at time T-1.  We proceed using induction.  Suppose
the innovator does not issue any new financial product from date t to T-1.  Hence
we must prove that there will be no innovation at period t-1.  By the inductive
argument, it is clear that the absence of innovation from t to T-1 is implied by:
(35)   0 ) s , s ( d
j h h
) h k(s =
+
 for h = t, t+1, ..., T-1 and  j = 1, 2,...,T-h.  Then we have that:
(36) 0 ) s ( r
h
) h k(s =
h = t, ..., T-1.  At date t-1, we have that, if there is some innovation, we must have for
any innovation introduced at t-1, the following must be true,
0 ) s , s ( d
j 1 t 1 t
) 1 - t k(s =
+ - -
for j = 2,...,T-1.  This is because  0 ) s ( r
h
) h k(s = for h = 2,...,T-1, and also  0 ) s (
t = y  for
every t, then we have that, from the delivery constraint:
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 to be true, together with non-negativity of returns.  In fact this also implies that
(38) 0 ) s , s ( d l 1 t 1 t
) k(s
1 - t = + - -
for l = 1,2,...,T- (t - 1).  But on the other hand
(39) ) s , s ( d ) s ( r l 1 t 1 t
s
) s ( k




1 t 1 - t
+ - - - -
=
- ￿ ￿ b = -
Hence  0 ) s ( r 1 t
) k(s
1 - t = -
.  But since  0 ) D ( C
1 T s >
-
, the first order conditions show
that the optimal amount of new financial products is equal to 0 for st-1.  By the
inductive hypothesis, it is true for any st, any t, concluding the proof.
Proof  of proposition 4
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such that for every
sT-1, for every s,   [ ] . 0 s , 1 T s > q -  Since at period T, we have that  [ ] , 0 r s , T s =  and since
, 0 ) D ( C
T s > > then we must have from the delivery constraint that  0 ) s ( 1 T > y - .
(Otherwise either the payoffs or the amount of past issues should be zero, leaving
us with the same argument as in the risk-neutral case).  This means that the price
that the innovator pays is at least equal to the maximum price that the households
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From the non-arbitrage condition for the innovator we must have:
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On the other hand, we know that the price for each of the Arrow securities
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for every s, every sT-1.  From profit maximization (for the innovators) we have that
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Hence
(49) [ ] s , s 1 T r - > d
 So we have a contradiction since we assumed that for  [ ] 0
s , 1 T s > q -  for every s to be
true we must have the opposite inequality.  Hence we cannot have a complete set
of Arrow Securities issued at any of the sT-1 nodes.
Proof of proposition 5
In this case, we can have two possibilities.  The first corresponds to the
case in which the innovator buys at st some positive amount of the riskless bond.
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In the first case, we have for some  s  that:
(54) ) s (
) s ( c u
) s , s ( c u
S s t ) s ( i '
) s ( i
t ) s ( i '
) s ( i
















) s ( c u
) s , s ( c u
S s t ) s ( i '
) s ( i
t ) s ( i '
) s ( i















=  [ ] ) s ( r
t
t s , s
for the same reason as in the proof of Proposition 4.   Since  0 ) D ( C
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cannot happen whenever  [ ] 0
s , st > q .  Then we have that the first inequality cannot
be possible.
Suppose that the second inequality holds.  But since  0 ) D ( C
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s >  for all s
in S, if we want  [ ] 0 s , st > q  for all s we must have that  [ ] d > ) s ( r t
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t  for all s.  But
this last inequality implies









b ) s (
) s ( c u
) s , s ( c u
t ) s ( i '
) s ( i
t ) s ( i '
) s ( i





for all s and then
Art.Kawuamura.pm6 18/07/03, 15:33 201202 CUADERNOS DE ECONOMIA (Vol. 40, Nº 120, Agosto 2003)
(56)
S s
) s , s ( q ) s ( ) s , s ( q
) s ( c u
) s , s ( c u
t t
t ) s ( i '
) s ( i
t ) s ( i '
) s ( i
















Adding over s  ˛ S we have that
(57) ) s (
) s ( c u
) s , s ( c u
S s t ) s ( i '
) s ( i
t ) s ( i '
) s ( i















￿ ￿ p d > d >
˛ ˛ S s S s
t t ) s ( ) s , s ( q ) s , s ( q
contradicting the inequality we originally started with.  Then we cannot have that
the allocation satisfying the condition (A) be supported by a complete set of
Arrow securities supplied in positive amounts for the case in which the innovators
buy some positive amount of the riskless bond.
If the innovators have 0 of riskless bond at st, then we must have that for
every state then innovators must finance the payments of the Arrow securities
issued at st with the receipts from the Arrow securities issued at s t+1.  Clearly again
we may have  0 ) s ( 1 t > y +  (in whose case the same argument as before applies) or
0 ) s ( 1 t = y + , in whose case the st+1 issues will be financed by those in period t+2,
and so on.  Therefore, if   ) s (
t y for t greater than t and smaller than T-1 are zero,
then it must be true that  0 ) s (
1 T > y
+  to satisfy the delivery constraint, but then
condition ( A)  implies a contradiction for t = T-1.  If  for some t  less than T-1 it is
true that  0 ) s ( > y
t   then the argument in the paragraph above applies.
Proof.  of proposition 7.
In case that condition (29)  holds we can argue by contradiction.  Suppose
there exists in equilibrium an incomplete set of Arrow securities issued at date T-1.
Call  ST the subset of states in S such that for every s in ST the amount  [ ] s , 1 T s - q
is strictly positive.  Therefore for every s in ST  it must be true that
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[ ] d + = -
- ) s , s ( C r 1 T
s , s 1 T .  By the same arguments as in proposition 4  it must also
happen that  0 ) s (
1 T > y
-  and so  . ) s ( q 1 T d = -   On the other hand, by those arguments
it was also true that
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but since u'(c) > 0 and p(s) for all s, this cannot happen.  Therefore
[ ] ) s ( q ) s , s ( C r
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- + = for s in ST cannot happen.  But then no Arrow
security can support this consumption allocation as an equilibrium in T.
This can also be generalized to any other period t provided that conditions
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for all s in S.  From (D)  we also know that
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Since this is true for all t, all st  then  0 ) s (
t = y  for all t and st.  However if
this is the case the delivery constraint cannot be satisfied since the innovator can
never finance the payments over the Arrow securities.  This finishes the proof.
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